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I 
I 
JN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEWLY UNCOVERED 
AUTHORITY 
Case No. 10710 
V'"' ' L STATE TAX : 
COMMISSION OF UTAH. r E D 
,1 1 .' s - 1967 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 75 (p)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Defendant, State Tax 
Commission of Utah, hereby directs the Court's 
attention to the case of St. Louis Refrigerating 
!_Cold Storage Co., v. The United States, 43 
Fed. Supp., 476, (Ct. Cl. 1942) cited in Defendant's 
brief herein but newly uncovered as to matters 
referred to in the dissenting opinions of the Court 
I anJ, therefore, pertinent to any rehearing herein. 
I In that case, the taxpayer was engaged in 
I rhe manufacture and sale of ice, the manufacture, 
distribution and sale of refrigeration, and the 
refrigeration of its own warehouses in which were 
stored many kinds of perishable commodities. It 
was alleged that the taxes were erroneously assessed 
2nd collected under Section 616 of the Revenue Act 
of 1932, the language of which has been conceded 
to have been before the Utah legislature when Section 
~9-15-4 UCA 1953 as amended was enacted. The 
Court defined the issue as "whether Plaintiff's use 
of electrical energy is commercial consumption as 
defined in the quoted provision of the Revenue Act. " 
I As the entire body of the opinion is pertinent to 
I various issues raised in the majority and dissenting 
I 
1 
opinions of the Utah Supreme Court in Union Pacific 
~oad Co. v. State Tax Commission, Utah 
I 
1--- 426 Pac. 2d 231, the Court's attention is 
I -
I 
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I 
l 
directed to the opinion which, in substantial part 
µrovides: 
"It is earnestly insisted by plaintiff that 
there is a zone between commerce and industry and 
that plaintiff's business in the main is within this 
twilight zone. 
"There is no distinction written into the 
termt> of the taxing provisions. The only exception 
named in the statutes is energy furnished the Govern-
ment or political subdivisions thereof. 
"True, Treasury Regulations 42 recognize 
certain named activities as neither commercial 
nor industrial within the meaning of the Act, but 
such regulations do not name the type of business 
actively involved in this case as falling between the 
two classifications. Besides, regulations may not 
serve to change the provisions of a statute. 
"Plaintiff insists that the intention of the Con-
gress, as reflected in the history of the legislation, 
was to reach only the individual consumers and the 
~mall business concerns and not users on a large 
scale. 
"The discussions in the Congress covered 
a wide range. Many individual statements were 
made. These are quoted in extenso by both parties 
ll'lth conflicting interpretations. However, the con-
terence report, which was made by a joint conference 
committee representing both the Senate and the House, 
and which was the last committee explanation before 
lht: final vote was taken, contained the following ex-
planation of the taxing provision which is involved 
- 3 -
" 'The House recedes with an amendment 
~ubstituting a tax of 3 per cent of the price paid for 
electrical energy for domestic or commercial use 
(as distinguished from industrial use) , to be paid 
by the purchaser and collected by the vendor, with 
necessary administrative provisions and an exemption 
in the case of electrical energy sold to the United 
States, any State or Territory or political subdivision 
thereof, or the District of Columbia.' 
"If any ambiguity existed and any explanations 
were needed apart from the language of the statute, 
this final joint conference committee report makes 
il clear that it was the intention that the term 'com-
mercial' should have a meaning broader than the 
restricted sense which plaintiff would have us apply. 
!t explains that the tax applies to commercial as 
distinguished from industrial use. It then exempts 
only electrical energy sold to the Government, 
National or State, or a political subdivision thereof. 
"We may add that this seems that the natural 
construction of the wording of the statute. 
"The use of the two terms by way of contrast 
followed by the reference to political subdivisions 
as the only named exemption would seem to preclude 
the intermediate classification which plaintiff attempts 
to read into the statute. 
"It hardly seems necessary to go behind the 
clear wording of the statute. Certainly it is un-
necessary to go behind the joint conference committee 
report into the maze of discussion and interpretation 
by the indi victual Members of the Congress when the 
:;tat1ne itself, which is the final product of their 
labors, is couched in simple language clearly ex-
L - L1 -
i 
pressed. 
"We think some of the confusion has arisen 
irum the effort on the part of the administrative 
Jnit to establish an intermediate field between com-
merce and industry. This makes the problem more 
difficult. Since there are no definite calls, the con-
struction of two dividing lines instead of one is made 
necessary, and the extent of such field, if established, 
can be measured only by the somewhat varying use 
of otherwise well-known words. 
"In the general understanding commerce and 
Industry cover the entire business field and while it 
i8 sometimes difficult to know whether a border-
line business falls mainly in the field of commerce 
or industry it is far less difficult than to attempt to 
establish shadowy lines. It is far less complicated 
to follow the generally accepted meaning of the terms 
which are used in the taxing statute. 
"This conclusion is further strengthened by 
the wording of the Act of June 16, 1933, in which 
section 616 is reenacted with only one change pertaining 
to exemptions, namely the exemption of publicly owned 
electric and power plants. The inclusion of this 
exemption indicates the exclusion of other similar 
exemptions. While the Act of 1933 has no applica-
tion to the period involved in the instant case, the 
naming of the exemption supports the conclusion 
that the Congress had no thought of establishing 
the intermediate business field for which plaintiff 
contends. " 
* * * 
"The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has 
a most difficult task in interpreting the numerous 
taxing statutes and the many statutory changes that 
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,re necessarily made from time to time by the 
Congress to fit the vase and rapidly changing bus-
1iicss structure of the country. But we must con-
;:;rrue the language of the Act as we find it. 
"It is contended by plaintiff that Congress 
Jfler the issuance of the Treasury Regulations 42 
1i;pcatedly reenacted the tax law without substantial 
change in this provision, thus confirming the Com -
missioner's action. The contention loses much of 
lts force in the light of the numerous rulings, dec-
isions, and exceptions that have been made necessary 
hy the complicated and widely varying nature of the 
many businesses affected. But if this viewpoint is 
Jccepted the fact remains that the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, who prepared the regulations, also 
held that plaintiff's business did not fall within the 
Jontaxable intermediate field. It would be rather 
1llogical to hold that the Government would be bound 
by the Commissioner's construction limiting the 
application of the statute as expressed in the regula-
lions, and at the same time disregard the Commis-
sioner's interpretation of those limits. 
"Even if the term 'commercial' were con-
~trued in the narrower sense for which plaintiff 
contends, it would not necessarily follow that it 
would be exempt from the tax. With the single 
exception of the manufacture of ice, plaintiff's 
activities are predominantly commercial. Its 
)ervicing is commercial. Its business is primarily 
cr)mrnercial. It follows the product in the process 
uf distribution. Its activities are an integral part 
of the current or stream of commerce. Thus, 
.
1 
regardless of whether the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue properly construed the Act in undertaking 
I 0Y regulation to exempt certain businesses on the 
I 
I 
l 
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ground that they are neither industrial nor com-
1 mcrcial, the plaintiff's business is subject to the 
I rax. 
I "It follows that plaintiff's petition must be 
dismissed and it is so ordered." 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
HENRY L. ADAMS 
Assistant Attorney General 
F. BURTON HOWARD 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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